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Abstract
This paper is a reprint of a sketch of an electronic-circuit-
designing program, submitted as a Ph.D. proposal. It describes the
Ki electronic design problem with respect to the classic trade-off between
expertise and generality. The essence of the proposal is to approach the
electronics domain indirectly, by writing an "advice-taking" programi (in
McCarthy's sense) which can be told about electronics, including
heuristic knowledge about the use of-specific electronics expertise. The
core of this advice taker is a deductive program capable of deducing what
its strategies should be.
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I. Introduction
It is by now a trite observation, but it is worth mentioning.
that Artificial Intelligence research tends to have two
contradictory goals: the production of intelligent expertise,
and the capture of the general nature of intelligence. The
exercise of subduing a particular intellectua.l domain by
formalization has now been done for several domains: assembly-
line balancing, checkers, symbolic integration, and mass-
spectrogram interpretation, to mention a few. Critics of our
assumptions can point out with much justification that doing such
an exercise fails to capture the notion of intelligence-in-
general.
Some of us retaliate by claiming that there is no such
notion, if we examine matters closely. This claim has merit when
used to refute the criticism that doing a formalization exercise
removes the domain involved from intelligence altogether, which
is absurd. (Hubert Dreyfus <1972> is a good source of such inane
criticism.)
But most workers have recognized that there is an problem
here. People have spent much effort on the problem of generality
since Al began. Projects that were or are concerned with
achieving it include GPS <Newell and Simon, 1963>, QA3 <Green,
1969> and other theorem.provers, MULTIPLE <Slagle and Bursky,
1968>, and STRIPS <Fikes and Nilsson, 1971>. I think all of them
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can be characterized by their attitude that "problem solving in
general" is a domain for which there ought to be an expertise.
The programs that result often use obviously useful techniques,
such as goal achievement and deduction, in an extremely elegant
fashion.
But none of them are experts in anything. All of them can
trg to work on any problem that can be expressed to them, and
they are designed so that a wide class of problems can be
expressed. But on interesting problems they fail. Evidently
"problem solving in general" is not a coherent domain apart from
a lot of special knowledge in each field. This is only fair:
human beings are not great in a new field without a lot of
practice.
But let us say GPS were modified to take hints. Each.time a
decision as to which goal to work on came up, it would pose this
as a goal. Then hints, in the form of suggestions for choosing
goals, would allow it to make more directed choices of how to
proceed.
This in itself is just not going to work, although the
principle is good enough for me to adopt it among others in Sect.
II.. It is too magical on the face of it. Closer consider-ation
reveals that the goal-chooser is going to have to tie together a
lot of very disparate information on any interesting problem.
This information is going to be scattered around a large data
base, so the system has traded a bush of simple goals for a goal
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of great complexity.
Sussman <1973a> has pointed out the problem here. The expert
has a procedure for solving problems-in its domain. The hints do
not get in the way precisely because the problems of what to do
next, at some level, has been taken care of--just follow the
procedure. The procedure knows what deductions to make, what
hints to use, what goals to propose or attack.
The fact that procedures are so good at this has led some to
embrace the Procedural Utopia view of AI, a more subtle
restatement of the claim that there is no "intelligence-in-
general." The utopian view is that hints and knowledge are just
procedures; that all we should be allowed to tell a program is
more program; that any natural-language or other declarative
input must be converted to imperatives. (Cf. <Winograd, 1971>.)
Then, since universality is a simple property for a programming
language to possess, generality must some day follow. To be
sure, it helps to have sophisticated languages and programs, with
features like pattern-directed procedure calls <Hewitt, 1972>,
multiple co-routines <Sussman and McDermott, 1972>, "multiple-
body interrupts" <Brown, 1973>, etc. There may also be some
simple (even declarative) information about procedures, such as
recommendations <Hewitt, 1972> or frames <Minsky, in progress>.
But the procedure must be king.
It has been my experience that this approach will not
succeed; that is, not at creating an intelligence. There are
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two reasons for this: (1) a program can only apply the knowledcgc'
it has in ways that were foreseen; -and (2) a new program; that is
added to the system is not at all guaranteed to work correctly
with its old programs, These two problems are related.
Allan Newell <1962> has the best example of (1). He cites
the difficulty of getting a chess program to answer a slightly
different question from the one it was written to answer. The
only controls you have on the behavior of such a program are the
inputs you wrote it to look at. If they aren't the right ones,
the program can't help you. The problem is clear: some
knowledge Went into writing the program, but the program is not
that knowledge; it is at best a knower. The phrase "procedural
embedding of knowledge" <Hewitt, 1972> is misleading. (Cf.
<Hayes, 1974>.)
As an example of (2), I can draw on my own TOPLE program for
finding plausible interpretations of declarative sentences.
<McDermott, .1974> When interpreting ambiguous sentences about the
spatial relation of two objects, it tried to visualize the
desired relation. If told "objectl is in object2," it tries to
believe objectl is smaller than object2. It if knows nothing
else, it reasons from its knowledge of what kinds of objects 1
and 2 are; it doesn't like to hear that a table 'is in a ball.
Having decided that object1 is smaller than object2, it next
inquires whether object2 is enclosed (e.g., a covered box as
opposed to a pen). If it is, object1 must be less tall than
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object2 as well. In isolation, tallness is like overall size (a
floor lamp is not likely to be in a music box), so TOPLE looks
for facts about individuals, then reasons from categories. But,
since often dimensions are considered together, it would be nice
if the system knew, "All other things being equal, the bigger
object is likely to be the taller." This might save it sonie
tedious computation about what kinds of objects it is thinking
about.
But there is no way to tell the dimension-comparison routine
this fact, short of rewriting it. That routine doesn't look for
advice; it just computes. And there is no way to add an
entirely new routine so that it can communicate with the old on,.
The old one is not taking calls.
One example like this may not be convincing. You can alw.ays
imagine a better, "more modular" way to have written the old
routine in the first place. But experience with computer
programs leads me to believe that all modularity has a finite
lifetime. You leave some slots and interfaces where later
changes can occur, but they get used up. Eventually a change
straddles two interfaces, or demands the creation of a newi slot.
Besides, as Sussman <1973a> has argued, there is a conflict
between modularity and efficiency. Procedures work precisely
because they ignore a lot of information that might be relevant.
In this proposal, I will trace the outline of a system that
is both expert and potentially general, that is willing to ignore
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probable irrelevancies, but able to make them relevant when they
are pointed out by a human. That. is, I have in mind a system
like McCarthy's Advice Taker <McCarthy, 1968>, a program that is
not necessarily brilliant, but is able to use any hint that is
given to it. I will use this name for want of something better.
Since even simple schemes often sound good on paper, I intend to
describe a concrete domain -- proposal of electronic-circuit
designs. The advice taker's expertise is intended tobe sound
enough so that the circuit proposer may interface with other
parts of the electronic circuit-design project being organized by
Gerry Sussman <Sussman, 1973b: Brown, 1973>. In what fol lows, I
first outline the structure of a deductive advice taker, then
describe its application to electronic-circuit design, and
finally attempt to meet the many objections that I anticipate.
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11. Ideas for the Structure of an Advice Taker
To start as down-to-earth as possible, let us imagine that a
decent problem solver must always think of itself as executing at
least one procedure, at some level. This procedure is associated
with one or more goals the system believes that it will help
accomplish. In keeping with standard termino.logy, I call the
execution of such a procedure a process.
The current process may be the result of the interpretation
of a program, a "plan," or some other such structure, by an
appropriate interpretive procedure, or it may be an abstraction,
such as a commitment to review every step with respect to a
global strategy. An important example is the control on a
deductive process represented by a declarative belief. For
example, one way (IMPLIES A B) might direct a deduction is to
instruct a suitable interpreter to propose (PROVE A) as a subgoal
of (PROVE B).
There may be more thaI. one active process; that is, a
process that "thinks" it is now running; whose interpreter has a
next step in mind. If one process knows the language in which
another process's interpreter thinks, the first can alter what
the second thinks, or "put ideas in its head," i.e., advise it.
It should also be able to give it control.
To facilitate such communication, it seems right to make each
interpreter (except for the machine, or Conniver interpreter)
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speak the same declarative language. Each interpreter keeps a
data base in this language that describes the state of
interpretation of its procedure. (I am indebted for many ideas
such as this to Scott Fahlman.) Fetching from such a data base
may be as general as a deduction, or it may be as narrow and
efficient as desired.
Thus the current interpreter of a robot executing a plan
might keep a data base describing the current piece of the plan
being worked on, and the current state of the world the plan .wao•:
affecting. "Careful-mode" execution of the plan could be
enforced by adding to the data base a statement, "Between plan
steps, the next step is: check for agreement between the
expected world model (as given by comments on the plan) and the
actual result of each step." (This won't work unless the
interpreter reads such messages. Having a common declarative
language is not sufficient to make messages understandable.
Further conventions will be necessary.)
The example may be extended. In testing a plan, the robot
will want to run it without affecting the real world. This
requires a new interpreter which simulates the effect of each
real-world action (or just the old one with still other
statements that redefine the meaning of action).
Finally, a plan is merely an object of some sort, which may
be altered or inspected as well as executed. We might as well
have it be denoted by an expression in our declarative language.
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So far,. except for a certain type of uniformity, this system
is no different from generalized control-structure <Bobrow and
Wegbreit, 1973>, ACTOR's <Hewitt, 1973>, Fahlman's frame system
<1974>, or any of a number of systems whose good ideas I am
trying to use.
The really important notion is that deduction is to be a
smoothly-integrated part of the system. A deduction is just the
operation of a (deductive) interpreter, using a data base as a
program. The deductive goal is to prove something from this data
base. (For technical reasons, the real goal may be to deduce a
contradiction from the negation of the given goal.) There is a
conceptually separate data base which records the current state
of the deduction, and holds advice to the deductive process, just
as for other processes. (This will be described in detail
shortly.)
Deductions are to occur, at least in principle, whenever a
process (including an interpreter) wishes to know something. For
example, a robot might ask, did execution of that step result in
what I expected? A circuit designer might ask, does the propos,':d
coupling circuit between two stages load the second stage? A
chess-move explorer, upon noticing a problem with a move, might
ask, is the reason this move failed likely to be a problem for
other moves as well? (...If so, amend the plausible-move
generator with a procedure that reminds every subsequent move
explorer to check this problem first.)
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The last example is an instance of an important kind of /
knowledge: how to exploit "bugs." <Sussman, 1973a>
The emphasis on deduction is likely to worry the many people
who feel deduction is a trap for naive Al researchers. (If the
following list of advantages is not convincing, section IV.
countering objections, may help. A helpful remark to make is
that I am using "deduction" in a very broad sense, analogous to
that in the phrase "probable deduction.'~ <Hume, 1955> 1 allow
reasoning processes such as induction, and "buggy reasoning"
(e.g., from general statements that are not true in every case),
in addition to necessary deduction. I could give this process a
new name (like "duction"), but I think a revival of the original
1967
word in Sherlock Holmes' sense <Doyler> is in order.)
Here is my list of advantages of deduction:
(1)(i) It is the obvious way to utilize information expressed in
declarative form.
(ii) It is a good way to discover relations among previously
unrelated data.
(iii) Deduction is a good framework for study of the
modularity problem.
(iv) A deductive system may look at much the same information
in simple or complicated ways.
(v) Communication conventions between deductive processes are
easy to establish.
In detail:
(i) I take it for granted that some information is
declarative.
(ii) The pattern matching used in deduction is able to
express looser relations between variables in formulas being
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combined than PLANNER-type matching, because matching semnantics
is more general than assignment semantics. If discovery of neii
relations seems to be too grandiose a goal, I will settle for the
ability to state new lemmas to the advice taker in a general
language.
(iii) A deductive framework is a good one for the study of
the modularity problem, because we can always take at least the
step of adding a new piece of information. Then, in many case.
knowledge of how to use that datum may be accumulated in the form
of comments on it.
Let me explain this further. Remember that a data base way
be regarded as a "program" to a deducer. It is not perfectly
ordered, because more than one rule of inference may be
applicable at each stage. If it is too expensive just to try
them all, the deducer may use comments about them to decide which
rule to try (this is another deduction); or it may set up a
longer-range plan (e.g., "this rule, then that one on its
output") in the form of an abstract process which the deducer is
aware that it is responsible for; or it may try one rule or
path, and use its knowledge of typical bugs associated with that
technique to make a better guess if it fails. (Cf. <Sussman,
1973a>.) At least while studying the modularity problem, this
framework helps to organize the different kinds of information
that are around.
In the long run, it is most probably true that more powerful
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methods of organization (analogous to compilation) will be
necessary. See sect. IV.C.
(iv) A deductive framework enables a system to look at much
the same information in simple or complicated ways. Sometimes a
deduction is a brute-force "filtering" of simple assertions.
Other times, it is a sophisticated problem-solving process, each
step of which must be considered carefully. This is not always a
domain-dependent variation; the same domain may require both
kinds of deductions. For example, in solving a design problem, a
goal of the form "does there exist a circuit that does so-and-so"
may arise in two differenL ways: when a complete such circuit,
completely thought out, is desired; and when planning is being
done for a higher-level circuit, and.quick verification that a
proposed module is feasible is required. In the latter case,
elaborate testing and criticism of suggested plans is out of
place. I believe that, in a deduction, these phases may be
skipped by alteration of appropriate inference rules. It would
obviously be harder to alter the behavior of an expert procedure.
(v) It is easier to establish communication conventions
between parts of a deductive process, or between a deductive
process and some other type, because the objects manipulated in a
deduction are so natural: deductive goals, rules of inference,
"brother goals" (e.g., in (PROVE (AND A B)), A and B are
brothers).
Conventions are important for the reason mentioned before:
PAGE 15
you can't send a computer a message unless it is listening. Two
arbitrary processes cannot communicate unless each knows the data
and control structures of the other. Any Conniver program has
all the potential power of the system I have been describing, but
it is usually illusory.
For example, a chess program might formulate its search for a
move as a deduction
(AND (PLAUSIBLE-MOVE ?M) (ACHIEVE ?M (CURRENT-GOALS)))
(This might seem a little strange for a deductive formulation as
opposed to a procedural one. This point will be addressed below,
Sect. IV.A.) Let us say a move M is proposed in deducing
(PLAUSIBLE-MOVE ?M). The brother goal then might discover a
problem with the move, a threat by the opponent that refutes it.
A plausible course of action might be to find a move M' to meet
the threat, and instruct the deductive interpreter (via
appropriate assertions) to return to the previous goal. now
formulated as (PLAUSIBLE-MOVE M'). Because a deductive process
is so transparently organized, it is easy to test its state and
alter it.
This last point is not completely obvious without some
comments on the concrete structure of the deductive interpreter.
Any process at all is clearly organized at the level of
subroutine calls, iteration, etc. A clear deductive interpreter
must be organized in terms of higher-level entities: goals and
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inference rules.
Within this constraint, there are several ways to organize a
deducer. The method explored by Nevins <1972, 1974a> in his
theorem-proving research seems excellent to me. It uses both
forward and backward deduction when appropriate, and is capable
of managing very subtle interactions in achieving brother goals,
It represents knowledge procedurally when that is the obvious
representation.
There are several changes and additions I would make to such
a theorem prover. First, I would make explicit some of the
information implicit in Nevins' program. For example, a goal of
the form (AND Al A2...An) may be attacked in several orders:
some of the A's should be tried first in parallel; others should
be postponed and used to filter the initial early results. All
of these possibilities should be stated and pondered explicitly.
Second, alternatives such as these must be considered
whenever a decision comes up as to what inferences to make. So
that this may be reasonably efficient, the deducer should fol low
certain principles like, "Generally, keep working on the current
goal." When an action is tentatively selected, a quick search
should show whether there is any possibility of some other action
beating it out. Only if relevant advice appears should it be
thought about. (This is a crucial example of being able to treat
information simply and efficiently when necessary (point (liv)
above). The most common deduction of what rule to apply next is
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of the form, "This looks good. Any objections? No? Then....")
It should be noted thct the actions to be picked from are
inference rules of all sorts, not just a member of a finite set.
Besides rules like
(2)(i) "if A is proved and (IMPLIES A B) is proved, you may
assert B,"
we might also have
(ii) "if you can't prove there are any blocks in the box. 'jo'.j
may assert that there are no blocks in the box."
(This rule is handled procedurally by something like the
THNOT device. <Hewitt, 1972> Notice that this latter method
requires the decision as to what inference rule to use to be
specified by the caller of the.deducer. Eg., the two statements
(THGOAL (NOT (EXISTS X (IN ?X BOXI)))) and (THNOT (THGOAL (EXISTS
X (IN ?X BOX1)))) have quite different procedural semantics,
where no such underlying difference exists. The only relevant
information here is how much knowledge you think you have about
BOX1. A box you can see deserves a THNOT; others may not.)
Information about choosing between rules may be called
"quasi-procedural" in that it specifies a preferential ordering
of actions. For example, an electronics designer might know the
following two coupling tricks:
(3.)(i) An appropriate buffer amplifier may be used to couplle any
two circuits
(ii) A transformer sharing a winding with an inductor is a
good way to couple something to a tuned circuit.
Then it should also have the further knowledge that (3ii) is more
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specific than (3i), hence, is preferable if they both apply.
Such orderings have been studied by Richard Brown <1973>, and
been shown useful in a procedural framework. The present
approach has the advantage of explicitness; the reasons for an
ordering, for example, may be stated in a natural way. Further,
there is no more order specified than is justified.
It is very important to be able to represent facts of the
form, "Generally so-and-so." This requires use of modal and non-
monotonic inference rules. (The THNOT rule is an example of the
latter; see Sect IV.A.) An instance of a rule for using such a
fact is from <McCarthy and Hayes, 1969>: "From (NORMALLY P) and
inability to prove (NOT P), infer P." (.0f course, the concept "I
am able to prove so-and-so" must be represented procedurally.)
Another such rule is, "From (NORMALLY (IMPLIES A B)) and A, infer
(NORMALLY B)." Connectives like "presumably" have been studied
by logicians in recent years, in mostly uninteresting I.ays.
<Prior, 1967; Kripke, 1963> I will freely use such concepts in
what follows.
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II. Electronic Circuit-Design Proposal
The program I expect to write as part of this project is
intended to be a module in an electronic circuit designer, which
is a joint venture between Gerry Sussman, Allen Brown and me, and
possibly others. The structure of this entire device is.
beginning to be sketched now. The basic idea is that circuits
are designed by a process of proposal and testing. My module,
the proposer, is to use its knowledge of electronics to propose
solutions to electronics problems, and criticize and alter them
until they are ready for testing. The tester (a human being in
early incarnations of the system) reports how the circuit
performed, and whether it works properly. If it doesn't, it is
handed to the "bug localizer" to be built by Allen Brown <1973>,
which reports, after any necessary tests, on which module is
malfunctioning (and possibly why). Then control is given back to
the proposer, with enough new criticism added for the proposer to
know what the problem is and try something else.
In this section, I will describe the structure of the
circuit-design proposer. In keeping with my desire for
explicitness, all of this structure will be in the form of
knowledge in a uniform language rat-her than hidden in an expert
program. However, a given piece of knowledge may appear in a
variety of formats. For example, an instruction to "do this,
then do that," may be expressed as a procedure ("this; that")
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which is chosen and interpreted, as the left side of an
implication ("this and that imply desired result"), or as a
statement that "this is preferable to that as a method to achievr
the result." In this part of my proposal, I suspend judgment .v.
to the best representation for each piece of information.
However, my bias toward the deductive representation should be
obvious by now. Particularly for the high-level organization of
the design proposer, the deductive notation seems most
perspicuous.
A. Recalling Old Results
When given a design problem, the proposer first attempts to /
see if it knows the answer already. That is, it tries to use
knowledge about particular circuits that solve "about the same"
problem as the one given. Recognizing such similarities is, of
course, a very hard problem in general, but I envisage here
nothing more sophisticated than template matching.
Generalizations will be as simple as having "18MHz" in the
problem statement match "high-frequency" in the stored circuit.
One could imagine a complex indexing scheme that enabled the
proposer to pull out appropriate circuits, but I prefer to keel)
the indexing simple, and treat this as a deductive problem.
Other advantages of this decision will appear shortly.
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For example, a desire for a "high voltage-gain AC amplifier"
should cause the common-emitter circuit to be proposed:
+..
NO~
CA ý -
(4 0-.C J t. 1
L.
This diagram, which is incomplete, expresses a lot of differenrt
kinds of knowledge. The visual part states the basic topology r-t
a common-emitter connection. This topology is "what comis; to
mind" when a common-emitter amplifier is under discussion. Paci'
of it, however, are more essential than others. The transistor
is the necessary transconductance that is part of any amplifier.
Almost everything else is merely suggested, or "typical," as
indicated by the comments surrounding the diagram. R1, R2, and
Re are part of a typical biasing network. C1 and the RL-C2
network are suggested capacitive coupling to other stages. Th,,rjI
are only suggestions; deeper comments explain what role they
play, so that they may be replaced by more useful circuits that
serve the same purpose plus others that may be required. For
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example, RL and C2 convert a dc-offset current into a decoupled
ac voltage with no offset. For some purposes, where an impedance
match with the next stage is harder to obtain, they may be
-. I 'rarI kI',
How knowledge like this may be used will be described later.
When a circuit is fetched from memory, the most immediate
task is to relate the circuit parameters to the given desired
parameters. In the circuit of Fig. 1, there must be comments to
the effect that:
(4) i.f there is no Re, or Ce is present, the (incremental) gain
of the stage is beta*RL/Rs (where beta is transistor gain and Rs
is source resistance). If Re alone is present, the gain is
RL/Re.
When the circuit is pondered, to some degree these facts
constrain beta, RL and Rs automatically, in the process of
pattern-matching. There are, of course, other constraints on RL
and Rs, and the proposer must be aware that it has little control
over beta. In addition, the fact as given must cause the
proposer to think about which of Re and Ce is present. This
depends on several considerations, including the type of
transistor, the bias stability needed, and the purpose of the
amplifier. (Ce would be wasted on a dc amplifier.) All of this
I ~r I a~Fiu ~yi
~~-~ ·d'Z
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is by way of illustrating that pulling a circuit from memory is n
very active process, which must automatically cause suggestioný.
to be considered, constraints to be posed, and subproblems to be'.
put forth.
I visualize this as a deducti've process, with advice on how
to proceed being on hand at the appropriate moments. The reason
for using deduction is that it provides the required active
framework for what is essentially index-searching. When there is
a goal of the form (IS ?X (AMPLIFIER (GAIN 108))), a simple
indexer suffices to fetch
(IMPLIES (IS ?X (COMMON-EMITTER (GAIN ?G)))
(IS ?X (AMPLIFIER (GAIN ?G))))
from the data base. The pattern-matcher binds X and G
appropriately, and proposes a goal (IS ?X (COMMON-EMITTER (GAIN
188))). Immediately this goal makes relevant the clauses of Fact
(4). At this point, straightforward deduction would generate two
goals: "?X has Re only"; and "?X has Re or Ce." These lead
through other facts to consideration of the role of the amplifier
and of RL and Re in it. Details are not possible to give no.w,
but it is clear that exactly these considerations are relevant.
(Although some, like biasing, should be postponed.)
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B. Inventing New Results
The proposer will not always know a type of circuit adaptable'
to the problem at hand. In this case, it must invent one.
Nothing mystical is meant by this:; we cannot expect a pr-ogram :ias
intelligent as the average technician to invent something brand-
new, like the superheterodyne radio.. Instead, the proposer mur:nt
leave the domain of standard circuits and enter the domain of
standard tricks. Many of these are methods of breaking probl'om
down along useful dimensions, then solving the subproblems
generated, and the subproblem of hooking the solutions together.
Here is a preliminary list of tricks:
(5)(i) Frequency division
(ii) Time division
(iii) Cascading
(iv) Substitution
in more detail:
(i) If a circuit is to have different behavior at different
frequencies, a group of circuits, each of which does the correct
thing in its frequency range, connected in parallel, w ill solve
the problem:
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(Each module is assumed to turn out a zero signal for frequencies
it doesn't handle.)
(ii) If the circuit's response is to be piecewise linear
(like a detector), do much the same trick, only decompose the
signal over the time domain, and use diodes to apportion the
pieces:
S .% I
(Again, each parallel module must give a U-signal for ranges it
is not concerned with.)
(iii) If a circuit behavior can be expressed as a product of
behaviors, a cascade of circuits, each of which realizes a
factor, will do the job:
A cascade is a more complicated idea than might first appear.
Usually, two circuits may not be hooked together without some
kind of coupling network. The following fac.t is relevant:
(6) if there is a coupling network cc that does not load the
output of cl or the input of c2, which transforms cl's output-
signal representation into c2's input representation, then cl--
cc--c2 is a cascade of cl and c2.
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Notice that this fact may be useful in applying tricks (i) and
(ii) as well. (In this fact, "loads" means "alters the 1iehavior
of." This requires study to pin down precisely; it is exactl'j
the sort of knowledge that is not taught in textbooks on the
subject.)
(iv) The next trick, substitution, is tougher to state, and
may just be an addendum on number (iii). It involves the
replacement of a part of a known circuit with a new part that
does what the old one did, and performs.the new function as we!l.
Practically stated, this is a cascade guided by the old circuit
as though it were a plan for the new one. That is, if the
problem is broken down as for Trick .(iii), and this breakdown,
except for a box or two, matches the breakdown for a previously
generated cascade, then use the old circuit, with the new,
differing blocks cascaded in in place of the old. This trick is
a little gl.ib, as stated. The intent is to be able to make use
of old coupling circuits and special knowledge -(e.g., special
multi-stage biasing tricks) noticed while assimilating the old
cascade. I admit that this is non-trivial, An example of it
will be given below. (Research may show that this trick is
actually a variant strategy in applying all the other tricks.
That is, it is an attempt to use an old plan of any sort.)
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Let me trace an example of the invention of a new circuit,
the tuned amplifier. Specifically, the problem is to design an
AC amplifier (low gain), which amplifies signals around 455 kHz,
rejecting all others.
Trick 5(iii) applies here. I will gloss over how it factors,
this description (this ability requires a lot of electronics
knowledge), and assume it can do it. In visual terms, then, the
response
I.
f i r
has been factored into
ts+~
PAGE 29
r"A .y n
~LI IIILII
where the AC amplifier is as given in Fig. 1, and the tuned
circuit is
The cascade trick has generated some subproblems: design an
AC amplifier, find an LC "tank" with resonant frequency 455kHz,
and cascade them. Presumably, the "problem factorer" doesn't
blindly generate breakdowns of problems, but uses it knowledge nf
circuit responses to propose good blocks. As it fetches them,
using the same active index-search process earlier, some
submodule design problems are solved "automatically." In
V'. 0.-
CM~u·~
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particular, before cascading, the range of beta and the values of
RL, Re, L and C will be picked.
Now, to cascade the amplifier and LC circuit, we need a
coupling network. The "suggested coupling" (capacitive),
unfortunately "loads" the tuned circuit, in the sense of altering
its resonant frequency, which is fixable, and lowering its
quality, Q, which is not.
This failure, I assume, occurs inside a goal generated by
Fact (6). The proposer tried the coupling that "came to mind"
and it failed. This should cause an "informed backtrack" (as
executed by, e.g., Fahlman's <1973> "gripe-catchers.") That is,
attached to the tuned-circuit description should be the notion
that
is a good coupling circuit for an LC tank. (This comment doesn't
have to be present, but if it isn't, the proposer will have to
thrash a bit.) Since a current is a possible output for an
amplifier, this suggestion results in the coupling-circuit
generator suggesting:
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as the coup!er.
Now we are essentially done. However, whenever a circuit (at
least an "important" one) has been generated, it is usually
worthwhile to think a little more about it. For one thing, it
must be filed away with comments, the cascade plan that led to
it, etc. I shall have something to say about this later, under
"Learning."
But before doing this, the proposer should make sure it has
done the best it can. In this case, it has had to introduce an
expensive inductor on the amplifier side. Although this may be
justified, let us assume the existence of a demon that catches
use of expensive parts (like a very large capacitor) and
concludes that a substitution (Trick (Siv)) might save money.
(Because a substitution replaces parts as well as adding them, in /
fact, it may be that Trick (iv) should always be tried first, but
that doesn't affect the overall plan.)
Is there a cascade plan for a device that approximately
matches "high, flat gain" + "tuned impedance"? If there are
adequate comments on the IF amplifier, it will do! The amplifier
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should have a comment that it is a cascade of the form
Vb'It&
where a transconductance is a wide-band voltage-controlled
current valve. (in this case, a transistor). Now we need a
circuit that takes a current and converts it to a voltage the way
Fig. 6(b) suggests. This is just the tuned .circuit
4- .MaI fv-ý
C c rrem
(from which the circuit of Fig. 7 may have been derived using
Trick (Si)). The resulting substitution yields
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(with comments) as a new version of the tuned amplifier, with
only one inductor.
This concludes the sketch of the proposer, except for a few
comments. First, it is obvious that the Circuit Tricks (5) are
not the only knowledge the proposer has. There must also be
gripe-catching, problem-factoring, and other electronics
knowledge. These have been assumed, and occasionally alluded to,
in what I have sai.d.
Second, there is some quest.ion as to the dividing line
between circuits and invention tricks, which are distinguished
only by having more comment (or "proposal") and less actual
circuit. In some cases, the line between recall and invention
will be quite fuzzy. The recaller might discover a very definite
-plan for a problem, whose boxes are not filled in with complete
circuit detail. For now, I classify all such things.as tricks.
The reason tricks are special is that they involve
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"recursive" calls to the proposer to generate sub-circuits. In
the example, these were subproblems that could be solved
immediately, by recall of generic devices. Thus there was no
substantive recursion of the entire proposer.
It is to be hoped that, at least on a first pass. the
proposer may retain this simplicity. There are lot of probleln
with the intelligent organization of a recursive tree of problrem--
solving processes. However, for other problem domains, like
digital design and program writing, subproblems are generated
which have never been solved before. This is not clone blindly.
but in such a way as to propose subproblems that "look easy."
The solutions to these subproblems are often postponed until the
higher level is worked out in detail, or even debugged. This
looks like another degree of complexity, whose introduction
should be postponed as long as possible.
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IV. Objections and Replies
Predicate-calculus theorem provers have gotten a bad name in
Al research, and most agree they deserve it. It seems that this
is because too many logicians have been involved in it., who have
spent too much time worrying about abstruse issues like
completeness and consistency, and too little worrying about
computation and understanding. These people have obscured the
really valuable work in the field, by people like Gelernter
<1963>, Bledsoe, Boyer. and Henneman <1971>, and Nevins <1972,
1974a> (to name only a few). I have attempted to follow their
lead in allowing the use of information of all sorts when
appropriate, not just axioms and theorems, and ignoring abstract
completeness when practical completeness, the ability of a systcm
to deduce something in the next year or so, is still an issue.
Even consistency is, as Minsky <in progress> has observerl, a red
herring at best; even a formally consistent theorem prover is
going to make practical mistakes (when its axioms fail to confo'ri-
to reality), and must learn how to correct them. An inconsiktnl:
theorem prover can use the same techniques to work around its
inconsistency.
Despite my ideological purity, my espousal of formal
reasoning is going to encounter objections. In this section, I
attempt to meet them in advance.
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A. Logisticity
Marvin Minsky <in progress> has noticed several drawbacks of
"logistic" systems. Briefly, they seem to be:
(7)(i) The dependence of the success of a logistic system upon
the isolation of a relevant micro-world small enough for it to
operate on.
(ii) The absence of THNOT in addition to NOT. (The inability
to draw conclusions from the inability to draw other
conclusions.)
(iii) Monotonicity: the inability of new information to block
a deduction.
(iv) Inability to specify qualifications on how some belief is
to be used. (Example: "near-to," a somewhat transitive concept,
whose transitivity cannot be applied repeatedly or, worse yet,
inductively.)
Another frequent criticism is:
(v) The requirements of logical rigor lead to axiom systems
that are too remote from real problems. For example, rigorous
geometry axioms require proof of collinearities which people
usually take for granted in order to get on to the interes-ting
questions. (The presumed reason is that relaxing this vigilance
leads to fallacies, i.e., inconsistencies.)
My system is not logistic in Minsky's sense, but it is likely
to appear as a fellow-traveler to a lot of people, so it is worth
checking how it fares against these points.
(i) This point is undoubtedly correct. Any deductive plan
must notice when it is really just bewildered, and should stop
and think first about que3tions like, what is the real structure
of the problem before me? The domain in which this question is
asked must be "micro" enough to make the answer clear.
Otherwise, it should switch to the following two-step plan:
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a. Ask, is the problem really the one I should be
working on?
b. If so, ask a human for more. information (for a good
plan, an overlooked lemma, etc.)
This point appears to apply equally well to a procedural system.
In fact, the use of a program does not apply at all to a
completely unstructured domain. In this case, we must start with
declarative information and figure out what the program should /
be. (Cf. <Sussman, 1973a>.)
(ii) & (iii) The monotonicity problem is real, but does not
occur in the system I have sketched. (Sect. II.) Besides, a
general analysis shows it to be part of a more interesting
problem, the problem of "passivity." Theorem provers tend to be
incapable of "actions," in the sense of "conscious actions
consciously taken." This is unfortunate, since in many cases
there are external actions that may be taken for deductive or
information-gathering ends. For example, there may be many
logical principles, memories, etc., that might tell you wjhether
there is a person in front of you; at a bank windoW, e.g., it is
likely there is a teller there. But it is much better just to
look and see rather than attempt a proof, in almost any case.
Logistic systems cannot usually state the former strategy,
although the latter is trivial:
(IMPLIES
(AND (ATROBOT ?W) (IS ?W BANK-WINDOW))
(EXISTS X (AND (IS ?X HUMAN) (FRONTROBOT ?X))))
It is easy, in Planner, to write a program to execute the "look
and see" strategy, but that avoids the usual issue ducked by the
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procedural approach: how do you state the strategy, e.g., as an
alternative being considered?
This is not a serious problem. A proposition of the form.
"under such-and-such condition, it is good to include 'look for i
person in front of you' in the current plan," is close to wIhat is
needed.
But this solution to the passivity problem solves the
monotonicity problem as well! All we have to do is let "try to
deduce so-and-so" be an action analogous to "look in front of
you." It is a primitive action, which, like other actions.
should be done only when it is cheap and useful compared to the
alternatives. I have stated it in Sect. II as a part of an
inference rule, inference rules being the actions available to .i
deduction routine.
(iv) Like Minsky, I have no theory right now about nearnew;.
But I think I have some top-level suggestions to make. First,
you need a rule that says, whenever you apply near-transitivity.
be sure to verify that you are not using it excessively. This
rule might be turned on conditionally. For example, if B is very
Ilong, (NEAR A B) and (NEAR C B) do not imply (NEAR A C). If I
(NEAR A C) was deduced from (NEAR A B) and (NEAR B C), verify
that A and C are not on opposite sides of B before concluding
(NEAR A 0) from (NEAR C D):
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('or (NEAR A t)
(Z~i fu( rC A f%
Second, suppose there is some kind of inductive rule like
(IMPLIES (TRANSITIVE ?P)
(FOR-ALL Y (IMPLIES (EXISTS S (SEQUENCE ?S ?P ?X ?Y))
(?P ?X ?Y))))
Where (SEQUENCE ?S ?P ?X ?Y) means ?S is a sequence S1, S2....Sn
such that (?P ?Si ?Si+l) and S1=?X, Sn=?Y. Then, we must amend
this rule to include the precondition (INDUCTIVE ?P). In this
terminology, if NEAR is transitive, it must not be inductive.
(v) This traditional criticism of logistic systems does not
carry over to more general deductive systems. For example, 1.here
Gelernter's <19•3> geometry-theorem prover was logistic, and
required a diagram as a subgoal filter, Nevins' <1974b> r ecrýlt
program thinks in higher-level, diagrammatic terms from the
start, and achieves much more directed behavior.
A program like this is, of course, as susceptible to
fallacies, in this case from a misleading or subtly impossible
diagram, as a human would be. Thus such a program will
occasionally generate inconsistencies like, "All triangles are
isosceles." This would bother a lot of theorem-proving
researchers, but there is no reason for it to. The proper
conclusion from such an inconsistency is, "I made a mistake,"
I
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not, e.g., "I must be insane." The right course of action is to
debug the data base to remove the problem. (Ways of doing this
in simple cases are discussed in McDermott <1974>.)
There is a stylistic criticism to be answered here as well.
Deduction as classically investigated seems to be in opposition
to plausible inference. People who believe in this distinction
are apt to think I am cheating when I use formulations (cf.
Sect. II) of chess-move generation like "look for plausible
moves and see if they work." They might say this is not really
deductive; a deduction would have to be of the form, "Prove
beyond a shadow of a doubt that some x is the best move
available." Others might say it is idle to cast it as a
deduction; I am just hiding a procedure.
This last criticism is the best; it may indeed be correct
that this level of chess-move generation should be procedural.
The issues, however, are not whether chess is a proper topic, or
the necessity of the answer desired, but are more like: are the
concepts really separable as shown (into plausibility and
verification)? is chess well enough understood so that an expert
should be written once and for all, at least at this level? is
the chess schema an instance of a more general problem of this
structure (e.g., the problem of "satisficing" search, that is.
finding a "good" element of a set in a reasonable length of
time)?
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B. Why Deductive Interpretation?
It might seem that we can dispense with a deductive
interpreter, and express all the knowledge we need in programS
directly. That is, instead of having
(8)(i) machine interprets deducer interprets data base
we might have
(ii) machine interprets Planner theorems
or something like them. (By "machine," I mean "Lisp
interpreter," or the equivalent.) Then, instead of a data base,
we would have a set of "theorems" compiled from a data base.
Indeed, this would be possible, but forcing this scheme in all
domains seems completely unnecessary, for the following reasons: /
a. To begin with, in the cases where (8ii) is more natural,.
my proposal allows its use. Some knowledge is naturally
expressed as procedures, and should be so expressed.
b. Experience has shown that the use of procedures is
successful only if they are well organized and well commented.
<Sussman, 1973a> <Fahlman, 1973> If this approach is carried to
its logical conclusion, the resulting programs seem equivalent to
commented declaratives.
c. The declaratives have the advantage of making as much
information as possible explicit rather than buried in the syntax
of a program. A declarat;ve goal like (AND A B) may be tackled
in more than one order, depending on circumstances. This is
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harder to arrange in a program.
d. Uniform use of procedures requires translation of all
incoming information into procedures. Most declaratives
correspond to more than one possible program. (IMPLIES A B), for
example, may be used in an "antecedent" or "consequent" manner,
either to deduce B from A, or pose (GOAL A) from (GOAL B). In
the many cases where it is unclear how to pick the proper
program, or even how to generate it among other choice!:;, it see,-m.-
harder in an imperative system to represent the uncertainty
involved.
e. A layer of interpreter always gives more control over .nl
process. This is because an interpreter maintains data
structures regarding the process it is performing, which are
close to the surface representation of the structure that it is
interpreting, and which may be inspected or altered. Compli Ilat i on
suppresses this information for efficiency's sake. This is a b:i:l
idea for a process elaborated from an undebugged structure (a
program or data base).
f. Besides, the real efficiencies depend on how well the
system understands the structure of its problems. This
understanding results from knowledge of mini-worlds, including
knowledge of how to use other knowledge. This requirement must
be met one way or another, and is independent of whether the
knowledge is represented procedurally or otherwise. (Bob Moore
pointed this out to me.)
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C. Building on Good Ideas
This section is aimed at a criticism that I think lies behind
most I have received: that by embracing deduction I am rolling
back the clock, and abandoning all the good ideas of the last few
years in A.I. From people's comments on early drafts of this
paper, I have compiled the following list of such "endangered"
good ideas:
(9)(i) Subproblemization
(ii) Ignoring information unlikely to be relevant
(iii) Goal orientation
(iv) "Defaults" and when they are overriden (one of many
concepts associated with "frames" <Minsky, in progress>)
(v) Consequent vs. antecedent computations
(vi) "rational form criteria" <Goldstein, 1974> (perhaps the
same as "local optimization criteria")
(vii) Gripe catching <Fahlman, 1973>, criticism <Sussman,
1973a>
(viii) Demons <Charniak, 1972>
(ix) Plausible Inference
(x) Information about using information.
In fact, I am aware of these ideas, and consider them very
important. Not to use them would be to admit stagnation in A.I.,
which is out of the question. Some of them, like
subproblemization, goal orientation, and consequent vs.
antecedent computations, obviously fit in my scheme. Others,
especially expression and use of information about information,
especially information about what to ignore, I have dealt with iat
length in Sect. II and elsewhere, precisely because recognitirvn
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of them would be the major advance of my deducer over previous
ones. The other issues I am aware of, but could not really claim
to have dealt with. If, however, the system I design is not
capable of exploiting them, I will consider it a failure. What I
expect is that the organization I have described will in fact
make it easier to exploit them.
I am comforted in this research by my impression that
disparate sections of the A.I. community are coming together over
a lot of these issues. "Proceduralists" are having to recognize
the uses of declarative comments <Sussman, 1973a: Goldstein,
1974>, and "declarativists" are recognizing that their data bas~e
are essentially non-deterministic programs. (Cf. Hayes <1973>
and Kowalski <1974>, two old theorem-provers whose current work
was brought to my attention after the first draft of this
proposal was written. They have things to say about implications
as programs which are similar to my theory, and are equally vague
as to the exact nature and use of a deductive control language.)
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D. Learning from Experience
Two contradictory objections must be met in this section, for
some people will say that my account of advice taking has left
learning from experience out altogether, and others w.ill think
that I have implicitly appealed to it too often.
I think this kind of learning has been downgraded too much b'h
many workers ih Al. The reasonable observation that there are
strong limits on what humans can discover has been used to
conclude that independent learning is not a very important
component of everyday adult intelligence. The. claim is made that
this kind of learning has been confused with learning "from a
teacher," which is much easier to tackle, and much less
mysterious. <Winston, 1970> 1 obviously agree that understandingj
is more profitable to study than discovery, or I would not be
studying advice taking, but I think that there is an important
component of discovery in understanding.
To illustrate what I mean, let me pursue an example of how a
"Mark 0" Advice Taker might learn from teaching. Assume it has
been taught about dc amplifiers and biasing, and about low-
frequency incremental models of transistors. These enable it to
design good ac amplifiers. It must know about capacitors and
passbands in order to choose coupling capacitors that do not
block signals. So, when I give it a problem requiring the design
of a high-frequency amplifier, it will just go ahead and design
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it as before, and it won't work. The Advice Taker won't know
this until I tell it (or Brown's bug-finder tells it) why the
amplifier failed: because it neglected transistor capacitances.
Once I tell it about these problems, including ways of
calculating them and minimizing their effect, it should be more
careful.
But here's *a problem; now it is altogether too cautious.
Its inclination will be to make sure with everu amplifier it
builds that the capacitors are not causing trouble. This is an
old AI problem; a program must usually be aware of how to use a
piece of knowledge as well as what it is, or it bogs down
examining irrelevancies. In this case, it is clear that one's
model of the transistor should depend on the frequencies
involved. This is a kind of "antecedent," or forward-deductive
knowledge.
Since this is a humble Mark 0, I will just go ahead and tell
it when to include transictor capacitances and when not. But I
think most people are smarter than that. They know that the
simple model used to work, and must still work, for the simpler
amplifiers. They figure out when to stay with the simple model
from their knowledge that essentially one detail, the frequeIC.I,
has changed. There is nothing brilliant about this reaý:oning.
but we still don't know how to automate it. Winston <1970> ha.
studied reasoning like this under more isolated circumýstinceF,
but a design situation appears to be more loosely structured th;l:n
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a Winston similarity network.
(Note: it may well be that for the particular example I have
given, some peop.le might think instead, "Let me start with the
full model of the transistor. Well, right away I can neglect all
the capacitors, which look open at signal frequency." This just
pushes the problem back to how to learn about capacitors.)
As ever, the learning problem has many facets. Here are four
concrete problems I expect to encounter:
a. In the long run, there must be More and more information
about assimilating new information. Initially, this will just be
an indexer of declaratives. But just having a piece of
information does not tell you how to use it. This must be
deduced from the way it is stated, knowledge about the domain
involved, and experience in trying it.
The most pragmatic such problem is that of understanding new
electronics ideas and circuits. When a human technician is shwon
a sample circuit of a given class, say a detector:
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he can usually understand what is the essential idea (here, thi-
diode), the signal path, merely the suggested coupling or
application (the left half of the circuit), the idealized load
(the resistor), etc.
As explained above, for now I would like merely to study honr
to tell this information to a machine. How to derive it from the
meaning of circuits and conventions in writing them is a probl )ii
Al en Brown, Gerry Sussman and I plan to attack later.
b. When a problem has been solved, the answer should be
stored in a form useful for the solution of future problems.
This is the closest thing to "independent learning" that I wish
to study. The problem here is that the way in which an answer is
stored influences whether it will be found later. For exa-mple, a
receiver filed away under "10MHz" will never be found again;
"high frequency" is much more useful. Clearly, how to store
particular circuits, cascade plans, etc. depends on electronics
knowledge, (This actually seems like a relatively easy problem,
at least for minimal results.)
c. The most interesting question is whether the Advice-
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Taking Proposer can learn from its brother modules' experience in
testing proposed circuits. Initially, a human begin will check
its output and tell it the things it has obviously overlooked.
In the long run, the proposer, the bug-localizer, and possibly a
global "Learning Module" must conspire to set the proposer
straight. (Whether there is learning in each module, or global
learning, or both, is a problem we are keeping in mind.)
d. A seemingly interesting problem that has been
indefinitely shelved is the.problem of compilation of know.iledge
into procedures. This was studied enough by Sussman <1973a> to
show that it is crucial and complex, but we are aiming for a
deeper knowledge of electronics than his HACKER had of blocks.
Compilation is not conceptually necessary (cf. Sect. IV.B). and
seems to follow a preliminary exploration of a domain. Beside•.
proper study of it seems to involve the question of progrf3am
design, which is more complicated (apparently) than circuit
design (cf. Sect. III, last comment).
To avoid any grandiosity, let me admit that I have little
understanding of these problems now, without having built a Mark
8. Humans seem to have an ability to summarize the difference
between one problem and another, as as to provide plenty of clues
later on as to which models and facts to use on a subsequent
problem. My hope is that a well-constructed Mark 8 will be a
good laboratory for the study of ways of attaining this ability.
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